# Ocean Accountability — Research expansion

**Reviewed: 8 September 2026.** Public-source synthesis; event dates and publication dates are recorded separately.

## Scope and method

This expansion investigates maritime exploitation across the Americas, with direct cross-ocean connections and clearly labeled comparisons. It adds 13 case files, 36 source-register entries and 22 selected actors to the prior collection. It also adds six bilingual country hubs, six complete Spanish lead files, three connected investigations and nine documented relationships. Counts are not counts of crimes or offenders.

Priority was given to original court, prosecutor, customs, ministry, parliamentary and regional-fisheries records. Investigative reporting and company responses are explicitly attributed. Searches were conducted in English and Spanish, with the earlier Chinese-language administrative record retained. Secondary reports were followed toward primary records where available. Several final judgments and compensation outcomes remain unavailable.

The research is not a fleet census, a live compliance certification, original witness interviewing or a replacement for reading the underlying documents. An investigation, import detention measure, arrest, conviction and sentence are different outcomes. An AIS country code is not a verified flag registration; an ownership or service link is not automatically complicity.

## Executive findings

- Administrative follow-up can add more than another seizure headline: Argentine parliamentary records document paid amounts in two 2020 cases.
- Labor accountability extends from recruitment to medical access and remedies. Zhen Fa 7 now has a dated 2025 U.S. import measure as well as reporting and a company response.
- Wildlife routes can use postal consignments, containers, residences and ordinary businesses. Fishery-only coverage misses those stages.
- Identity and control change over time. Damanzaihao’s removal from an IUU list and the non-adoption of proposed boarding-refusal listings must remain visible alongside the original allegations.
- The geographic and state connections vary. Chinese-born ownership, China-market demand, a Chinese-flag ship and a documented government instruction are not interchangeable.

## Three connected investigations

### Who controls the fleet—and who keeps it working?

A flag, a radio identity, a corporate owner and a service provider answer different questions. The records become more powerful when those differences stay visible.

[Read the investigation](https://oceanaccountability.com/investigations/who-controls-the-fleet/)

#### The company is not the whole network

A vessel can have a registered owner, an operating company, a financier, a recruitment agency and a carrier handling its catch. Those links create places to investigate responsibility, but they do not make every participant responsible for every act. Our approach is to attach a date and a specific kind of relationship to each link. A loan guarantee is not ownership; a port service is not proof of knowing assistance.

Pingtan’s own filings describe vessel collateral and guarantees for Hong Long’s borrowing. Treasury later designated Pingtan, Fuzhou Honglong and Xinrong Zhuo, while Pingtan asserted compliance in its response. Reading the filing, government action and company response together reveals a financial structure without turning a bank connection into an unsupported complicity claim. [S37: Pingtan Marine Enterprise / SEC](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1517130/000114420414014498/v370386_10k.htm); [S03: U.S. Treasury](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1154); [S12: Pingtan Marine Enterprise; SEC filing repository](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1517130/000121390022082180/ea170524ex99-1_pingtan.htm)

#### Identity needs more than a name on a screen

The Yong Xing 1 analysis identifies sequential broadcasts using country codes associated with China, South Korea and Argentina. That is evidence about radio identifiers. It is not, by itself, evidence that three flag registries accepted the vessel. The same report associates a broadcast alias with the sequence; the historical SPRFMO entry supplies an IMO number for the Chinese vessel. Matching names alone is not enough to identify a hull. [S60: Global Fishing Watch](https://globalfishingwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/GFW-2021-FA-SQUID2020-EN-1.pdf); [S72: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/7th-CTC-2020/meeting-documents/CTC7-Doc08-rev1-Commission-Record-of-Vessels-Implementation-Report-b.pdf)

A second record is unusually useful because the Chinese regulator itself describes the discrepancy: Hai Zhi Xing 801 and Ming Xiang 899 were associated with the same AIS identifier. The ministry ordered action and left an underlying relationship for further investigation. The unresolved part must remain unresolved in a network display. [S36: PRC Ministry of Agriculture](https://www.moa.gov.cn/nybgb/2018/201803/201805/P020180528572092099065.pdf)

#### Follow a sale through the regulatory outcome

Damanzaihao exposes the danger of freezing a ship in its worst historical moment. The Pacific Andes-linked factory vessel was placed on SPRFMO’s IUU list in 2015. A broker documented its 2018 sale to Russian interests. The Commission removed it from the list in 2020 after considering the changed ownership and associated assurances. [S68: SeafoodSource; Sean Murphy](https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/pacific-andes-vessel-placed-on-iuu-fishing-list); [S66: Atlantic Shipping](https://www.atlanticship.dk/triple-sale-by-atlantic-shipping/); [S64: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/7th-CTC-2020/CTC7-Meeting-Report-10Mar2020.pdf); [S65: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/8th-Commission-2020-COMM8/COMM8-Meeting-Report-Final-10Mar2020.pdf)

The intervening port-service record matters too: the compliance material discussed assistance in several jurisdictions, including China’s acknowledgement of a Dalian call. That gives a concrete sequence to examine. It does not justify claiming that the former group still owns the vessel, or that a historic listing remains in force. [S63: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/7th-Commission-2019-COMM7/reports/ANNEX-4-COMM7-2019-Final-Compliance-Report.pdf)

#### Where state direction is actually documented

The 2022 boarding dispute provides a stronger kind of state connection than ownership or subsidies. SPRFMO’s record says China acknowledged directing Zhou Yu 929 and Pu Yuan 755 not to accept U.S. boarding. China disputed the implementation and procedural requirements. The 2023 Commission did not adopt the proposed adverse compliance assessment or add the vessels to a final IUU list. Both the direction and the institutional outcome belong in the account. [S61: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/11th-Commission-2022-COMM11/COMM11-Report/SPRFMO-COMM11-Report-2023-with-annexes.pdf); [S62: SPRFMO](https://sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/10th-CTC-2023/SPRFMO-CTC10-Report-2023-final-with-Annexes.pdf)

This is why the site keeps two questions separate: what conduct occurred, and what the evidence establishes about government involvement. A documented instruction in one boarding episode does not establish government orders for unrelated fishing, labor or cargo offenses.

#### The next records that would change the picture

For an ownership investigation, the most useful additions are dated corporate filings, sale agreements, beneficial-owner declarations and matching hull identifiers. For support activity, they are contracts, manifests and actual service dates. For alleged evasion, identify the specific rule, the transaction and the applicable parties before reaching a conclusion.

The current collection is a set of traceable case connections, not a complete beneficial-ownership census. Its historical links can guide further investigation, while disclosed gaps prevent a convenient diagram from becoming a claim the documents cannot sustain.

### When the crew cannot leave

The labor story begins with recruitment and continues through pay, medical care and the possibility of getting home. A cargo restriction is only one part of accountability.

[Read the investigation](https://oceanaccountability.com/investigations/the-crew-cannot-leave/)

#### The recruitment promise and the actual job

The Lu Qing Yuan Yu 901 case starts on land. Indonesian reporting citing police describes men promised factory work in South Korea who instead ended up on a fishing vessel. Two men escaped and were rescued near Indonesian waters in June 2020. The reported criminal investigation concerned recruiters, including alleged document forgery. This collection has not established a final judgment against those suspects. [S58: ANTARA](https://en.antaranews.com/news/150860/clamor-grows-for-ending-trafficking-slavery-on-the-seas); [S59: The Jakarta Post](https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/16/police-name-three-recruiters-as-suspects-in-chinese-vessel-human-trafficking-case)

That is a cross-ocean comparison, not evidence that this vessel operated off South America. Its value is the mechanism it exposes: a job offer, a placement chain and a change in the work actually performed. The next proof should come from contracts, recruitment payments, testimony and the court record—not from merging it with a similarly named vessel’s abuse case.

#### At sea, an exit can depend on somebody else

An employment relationship can become coercive through debt, withheld wages, threats or restrictions on leaving. Long voyages and reliance on the ship for food, water and transport may deepen a worker’s vulnerability. These conditions need evidence in the individual case; fatigue or a ship’s distance from shore alone does not establish trafficking. [S29: International Labour Organization](https://www.ilo.org/resource/qas-business-and-forced-labour-0)

The Long Xing 629 file connects recruitment reporting with Treasury’s Dalian Ocean Fishing findings and CBP’s May 2021 fleet-wide import order. The reported Indonesian proceedings include both trafficking and unlawful recruitment outcomes; those offenses should not be collapsed into one label before the original judgments are obtained. [S03: U.S. Treasury](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1154); [S09: U.S. Customs and Border Protection](https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-withhold-release-order-chinese-fishing-fleet); [S10: Tansa and reporting partners](https://en.tansajp.org/investigativejournal/7769/)

#### Zhen Fa 7: an investigation acquires an administrative outcome

Reporting on Zhen Fa 7 follows a voyage through South American fishing grounds and describes crew abuse, illness and access to medical help. The operator’s response disputed the reporting’s account and defended its working arrangements. The case now has an additional official milestone: on 28 May 2025, CBP issued a Withhold Release Order covering seafood harvested by the vessel. [S45: The Outlaw Ocean Project](https://theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/a-fleet-prone-to-captive-labor-and-plunder/); [S44: The Outlaw Ocean Project / company response](https://theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/discussion/stakeholders/rongcheng-wangdao-dayang-aquatic-products-co-ltd/); [S42: U.S. Customs and Border Protection](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/3e282c2)

A WRO directs detention of covered imports under the U.S. forced-labor framework; it is not a criminal conviction of the captain, crew or every buyer. It creates a cargo-control outcome. It does not, by itself, show that affected workers received wages, compensation or an effective remedy. The site therefore records its issuance without presenting the measure as the end of the story. [S42: U.S. Customs and Border Protection](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/3e282c2)

#### The port is an opportunity to help—and to preserve evidence

Montevideo and other ports can be places where illness, missing wages and deaths become visible to authorities or worker-support organizations. ITF’s regional records cover more than one flag and different causes of death or disappearance. They cannot support treating all crew deaths as murder, or all visited vessels as offending vessels. [S07: International Transport Workers’ Federation](https://www.itfglobal.org/sites/default/files/node/resources/files/250212-Squid-Fishing-digital-_0.pdf)

The practical research questions are specific: when was care requested, who could authorize leaving, when did authorities learn of the situation, and what followed? An arrival, medical call, repatriation or wage claim should be attached to the correct person and hull without exposing private medical files or witness contact details.

#### Follow the remedy, not only the abuse

A complete follow-up should look for final recruitment judgments, the labor claim, money actually paid, repatriation and compensation received. An order to pay is different from payment. A trafficking prosecution against a recruiter is different from a finding against a vessel operator. Those distinctions show where accountability succeeded and where it may have stopped.

The most valuable next addition may be a small verified outcome: a wage settlement, a judgment identifying who recruited whom, or a documented response to a medical request. Such records often reveal more about an exploitative process than another dramatic but unverified account.

### Follow the catch after it leaves the water

Carriers, postal parcels, drying houses and false-origin labels show how marine exploitation can continue far from a fishing deck.

[Read the investigation](https://oceanaccountability.com/investigations/follow-the-catch/)

#### The transport stage can be the offense

The Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 judgment concerned transport of protected wildlife. That distinction matters: the refrigerated carrier did not need to be the catching vessel for its cargo to carry legal consequences. Its seizure does not establish where every animal was caught. Separately, China’s ministry documented unauthorized transfers involving the carrier and other operations. [S02: Ecuador, Corte Nacional de Justicia](https://www.derechosdelanaturaleza.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/PESCA-DE-TIBURON-EN-GALAPAGOS-SENTENCIA-CASACION.pdf); [S36: PRC Ministry of Agriculture](https://www.moa.gov.cn/nybgb/2018/201803/201805/P020180528572092099065.pdf)

Following a catch therefore requires at least two records: the fishing event and each later transfer. A meeting between ships is a lead, not a manifest. A cargo inventory can identify what was aboard, while a permit or catch certificate determines what was authorized. A discrepancy between them deserves investigation rather than an assumed explanation.

#### The label and the contents can tell different stories

Argentina’s Tai An material combines a scientific review of toothfish catches with prosecutors’ report of boxes whose labels did not match their contents. The prosecution notice does not name the ship; the matching voyage and inspection chronology is explained in the case file. The operator disputed the characterization of the toothfish catch. These are questions about declarations, authorizations and catch composition—not proof supplied by the owner’s birthplace. [S49: INIDEP; Martínez, Wöhler, Troccoli and Di Marco](https://marabiertonew.inidep.edu.ar/server/api/core/bitstreams/c1a38c58-e656-4d0e-8626-1e9d1fc3d487/content); [S48: Argentina, Ministerio Público Fiscal](https://www.fiscales.gob.ar/fiscalias/ushuaia-la-fiscalia-solicito-medidas-para-investigar-el-posible-dano-ambiental-de-un-buque-chino-que-pescaba-merluza-negra-de-forma-ilegal-en-el-mar-argentino/); [S50: Infobae; Sergio Serrichio](https://www.infobae.com/economia/2025/06/09/el-empresario-chino-multado-por-capturas-ilegales-y-dano-ambiental-denuncio-al-consejo-de-pesca-quiere-cuota-de-merluza-negra-la-especie-mas-valiosa-del-mar-argentino/); [S73: elDiarioAR; Gabriel Ramonet](https://www.eldiarioar.com/politica/misterioso-rembrandt-175-toneladas-merluza-negra-empresario-chino-acusado-pesca-ilegal_1_11248385.html)

The separate Casey’s Seafood prosecution shows a completed false-origin case: a U.S. processor sold imported crab as domestic product. DOJ’s contemporary records document James R. Casey’s 45-month sentence in January 2019. The overseas source countries included China and several other countries. The admitted U.S. labeling offense does not establish that the overseas catch itself was illegal or that all suppliers joined the scheme. [S69: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/owner-seafood-company-charged-atlantic-blue-crab-scam); [S70: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2019/03/25/february_2019_bulletin_redacted_0.pdf); [S71: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/owner-seafood-company-sentenced-prison-blue-crab-scam)

#### Small consignments can form a wildlife route

Peruvian prosecutors reported a five-year sentence against Yuelin Gan Cao for shark fins moved in three postal consignments toward Hong Kong. This is a documented route through a delivery system; it is not an allegation that the postal carrier knowingly joined the offense. [S51: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/747604-fiscalia-logro-condena-a-ciudadano-por-trafico-ilegal-de-fauna-silvestre); [S52: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/749095-fiscalia-logra-carcel-efectiva-para-hombre-que-iba-exportar-aletas-de-tiburon-por-encomienda)

At a different scale, Hong Kong Customs reported two 2020 seizures of suspected scheduled shark fins shipped from Ecuador. Those records establish the seizure and origin declared for the shipments. They do not identify the catching fleet or prove the sharks came from Galápagos. The site keeps that chain of unknowns visible. [S53: Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department](https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202005/06/P2020050600631.htm)

#### The drying house and the furniture business

The Song Shen Zhen record describes totoaba bladders found in a vehicle and a Calexico residence used for drying. The subsequent U.S. sentence and restitution order supply an outcome beyond seizure. The Kaven prosecution, separately, followed a furniture business used in a Mexico–U.S.–China marine-wildlife smuggling route. [S55: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/fishy-business-smuggler-swim-bladders-sentenced-federal-court); [S56: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/massive-trade-endangered-species-uncovered-us-attorney-charges-7-smuggling-swim); [S06: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/enrd/file/783721/dl?inline=); [S35: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/enrd/file/815486/dl)

Neither case requires inventing a state sponsor or an uncharged buyer. The concealment method—where goods were stored, how a business was used, what was declared and what was admitted—already provides a concrete account of exploitation beyond fishing.

#### Build the chain one lot at a time

The strongest next evidence is a sequence of matching lot numbers, species records, weights, permits, transfer declarations and invoices. Where quantities conflict, retain both dated records. Hong Pu 16 is one example: initial and later Argentine records report different cargo amounts. Selecting the larger number without explanation would make the story simpler and less reliable. [S39: Argentine Navy](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/el-patrullero-oceanico-ara-bouchard-arribo-puerto-belgrano); [S40: Argentina, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/informe_130-_hdn.pdf)

This collection does not map every shipment to a final supermarket or restaurant. Where a buyer link is missing, it says so. A traceable route with one openly missing step is more useful for investigators than a complete-looking supply chain constructed from proximity, nationality or a shared company name.

## New case files

### C19 — Zhen Fa 7: from crew-abuse reporting to a U.S. import hold

**Import order + reported abuse · Pacific and Atlantic South America / United States · 2020–2021 voyage; 2023 reporting; 2025 import order**

An investigation followed sick crew members through South American waters. In May 2025, U.S. Customs ordered detention of seafood harvested by the vessel on forced-labor grounds.

The Outlaw Ocean Project identifies Zhen Fa 7 by IMO 8776966 and operator Rongcheng Wangdao Ocean Aquatic Products. Its reporting connects Indonesian crew members Daniel Aritonang and Heri Kusmanto to illness, alleged violence and delayed medical care during the vessel’s South American voyage. [S43: The Outlaw Ocean Project](https://b2p.theoutlawocean.com/vessels/zhen-fa-7); [S45: The Outlaw Ocean Project](https://theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/a-fleet-prone-to-captive-labor-and-plunder/)

The crew investigation described recruitment debt, retained identity documents and financial penalties for leaving. Those mechanisms matter because a worker can be unable to exit even without a locked door. The operator denied abuse and withheld wages in its published reply. [S44: The Outlaw Ocean Project / company response](https://theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/discussion/stakeholders/rongcheng-wangdao-dayang-aquatic-products-co-ltd/); [S45: The Outlaw Ocean Project](https://theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/a-fleet-prone-to-captive-labor-and-plunder/)

Effective 28 May 2025, CBP instructed U.S. ports to detain seafood harvested by Zhen Fa 7. The order rests on information reasonably indicating forced labor, a different evidentiary threshold from a criminal conviction. Importers may seek to establish admissibility under the procedures in the notice. [S42: U.S. Customs and Border Protection](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/3e282c2)

**Why it matters.** This is a direct bridge between working conditions at sea and access to a major consumer market. A vessel-specific border measure can follow cargo beyond the port where it first lands. But tracing goods through a carrier, processor and importer still requires transaction-level evidence; a supplier relationship is not proof that every downstream product contains this vessel’s catch.

**Response and procedural posture.** Rongcheng Wangdao told the reporters it had investigated and found no support for the alleged mistreatment, violence or withheld salaries. That denial remains attached to this file; CBP subsequently issued its own administrative import order. [S44: The Outlaw Ocean Project / company response](https://theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/discussion/stakeholders/rongcheng-wangdao-dayang-aquatic-products-co-ltd/); [S42: U.S. Customs and Border Protection](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/3e282c2)

**Unresolved.** The reviewed materials do not establish a final criminal judgment against the captain or operator, a complete remedy for the affected families, or the contents of any particular retail package. The May 2025 import order is verified; a current official modification check is still needed before treating its status as real-time advice.

**State connection.** The vessel’s Chinese flag and operator are documented. These records do not establish that the Chinese state directed the alleged abuse. The U.S. import response is a separate state action.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/zhen-fa-7/)

### C20 — Hong Pu 16: the seizure, the cargo and the money collected

**Administrative sanction and payment · Argentina / Puerto Madryn and Bahía Blanca · May–June 2020; parliamentary follow-up in 2021**

Argentina’s records go beyond the pursuit of a squid vessel: they report an administrative penalty, cargo compensation and money actually collected.

The Argentine Navy says it detected the Chinese-flagged Hong Pu 16 fishing without permission on 4 May 2020. It reported the AIS switched off, an attempted departure toward the high seas and a boarding after pursuit. This account combines direct inspection with tracking observations rather than relying on an AIS gap alone. [S39: Argentine Navy](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/el-patrullero-oceanico-ara-bouchard-arribo-puerto-belgrano)

A later government report to Congress records AR$50,394,450.96 collected for the fine, cargo and operating costs. Its detailed account says the initial AR$10 million fine was reduced to AR$7.5 million under the statutory payment provision, and reports payment on 12 June. [S40: Argentina, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/informe_130-_hdn.pdf)

The first Navy account described 300 tonnes of frozen squid and 700 kg fresh. The later parliamentary account used approximately 212 tonnes for the forfeiture calculation. These are different official cargo figures; the site does not add them together or present the first estimate as the settled quantity. [S39: Argentine Navy](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/el-patrullero-oceanico-ara-bouchard-arribo-puerto-belgrano); [S40: Argentina, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/informe_130-_hdn.pdf)

**Why it matters.** Following the payment changes the story from a dramatic intercept to measurable enforcement. It also shows why headlines quoting only the fine miss cargo-value recovery and operational expenses. Amounts are historical Argentine pesos, and their deterrent value cannot be judged by converting them at today’s exchange rate.

**Response and procedural posture.** The parliamentary report describes the sanction and receipts. A separately attributable owner or captain statement was not located. The official cargo estimates are reported side by side rather than silently harmonized. [S40: Argentina, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/informe_130-_hdn.pdf)

**Unresolved.** The underlying inspection inventory and final administrative instruments are not reproduced in the reviewed sources. The cargo discrepancy remains explicit. No final criminal conviction is claimed, and later vessel operation is not independently traced here.

**State connection.** Chinese flag registration connects the vessel to a flag state; it does not establish a state order to fish illegally. The documented action in this file is Argentine enforcement.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/hong-pu-16/)

### C21 — Lu Rong Yuan Yu 668: a pursuit followed by a negotiated return

**Administrative sanction and payment · Argentina / Puerto Madryn · 28 April–29 May 2020; 2021 follow-up**

The fishing vessel escaped the initial boarding attempt, then returned to Argentine jurisdiction after contact with its operator and Chinese authorities.

Prefectura’s contemporaneous announcement dates detection to 28 April 2020 and the escort into Argentine waters to 13 May. It describes deployed fishing gear, unanswered radio calls and a departure toward the high seas. Administrative and judicial proceedings followed. [S41: Argentina, Prefectura Naval](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/prefectura-escolta-hacia-mar-territorial-argentino-un-buque-infractor)

Informe 130 identifies the paying company as Rongcheng City Rongyuan Fishery Co. Ltd. and reports a total of AR$34,805,847.83 collected for the fine, cargo and enforcement costs. A separate detailed response records a 25% reduction of the original AR$20 million fine and payment on 29 May. [S40: Argentina, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/informe_130-_hdn.pdf)

The same report describes contact with Chinese diplomatic authorities before the vessel entered Puerto Madryn. This is a documented instance of cross-border cooperation producing submission to jurisdiction, not proof that every pursuit requires a dangerous physical interception. [S40: Argentina, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/informe_130-_hdn.pdf)

**Why it matters.** An enforcement system can combine observation, evidence preservation, contact with an operator and diplomatic cooperation. This case also separates the roles of a ship, its company and the flag state. A fine paid by a company is a firmer outcome than a press announcement that a vessel may face penalties.

**Response and procedural posture.** Argentina reports that company representatives accepted the administrative procedure and paid. No separate operator statement was located. An older retrospective enforcement page refers to March 2020; the contemporaneous release and parliamentary account establish April–May. [S40: Argentina, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/informe_130-_hdn.pdf); [S41: Argentina, Prefectura Naval](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/prefectura-escolta-hacia-mar-territorial-argentino-un-buque-infractor)

**Unresolved.** Government accounts contain small differences in component costs and some retrospective chronology. This file uses the dated escort announcement and the parliamentary total. The final disposition of the resistance-to-authority proceeding was not obtained; an administrative payment is not described as a criminal conviction.

**State connection.** The reviewed account records Chinese diplomatic cooperation in the vessel’s return. It does not establish Chinese government direction of the fishing violation.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/lu-rong-yuan-yu-668/)

### C22 — Run Da 608: a squid seizure becomes a criminal trial

**Seizure; prosecution referred to trial · Peru / Áncash and Chimbote · 2018 seizure; October 2020 prosecution update**

Peruvian authorities seized squid and later sought a criminal sentence for the captain. The distinction between that request and an actual verdict is central to the record.

Peru’s production ministry announced the seizure of 19 tonnes of squid from the Chinese vessel Run Da 608 in Áncash in 2018, describing it as illegally caught. Several national agencies participated in the investigation. [S46: Peru, Ministerio de la Producción](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/produce/noticias/23257-ministerio-de-la-produccion-decomisa-19-toneladas-del-recursos-pota-de-una-embarcacion-china)

On 23 October 2020, the Public Ministry announced that captain Zhuang Hanbo would face oral trial for alleged illegal extraction of aquatic species in prohibited waters. Prosecutors connected the case to a 2018 complaint about squid fishing inside Peru’s maritime zone. [S47: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/309445-ministerio-publico-consiguio-que-caso-run-da-608-pase-a-juicio-oral)

The prosecutor requested three years and four months of imprisonment and S/71,250 in civil reparation, the latter jointly with Zhoushan Zhongju Ocean Fisheries. These were requested outcomes; the announcement does not establish that the court imposed them. [S47: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/309445-ministerio-publico-consiguio-que-caso-run-da-608-pase-a-juicio-oral)

**Why it matters.** This file exposes the gap between seizure announcements and judicial accountability. It gives the public a named captain, company and prosecuting office to follow, while keeping the trial threshold separate from proof of guilt. A future judgment could materially change the file and should be added with its appeal status.

**Response and procedural posture.** The reviewed ministry and prosecution releases do not contain an attributable defense response. The captain’s presumption of innocence is preserved for the unresolved criminal proceeding; the requested sentence is not called a conviction. [S47: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/309445-ministerio-publico-consiguio-que-caso-run-da-608-pase-a-juicio-oral)

**Unresolved.** A final criminal judgment, any appellate ruling and proof of compensation payment were not obtained. Vessel aliases reported elsewhere should not be merged into this record without stable identifiers and a dated registry chain.

**State connection.** The official prosecution identifies a Chinese captain and named fishing company. It does not establish a government order, fraudulent nationality registration or guilt of the entire crew.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/run-da-608/)

### C23 — Tai An: juvenile toothfish, disputed gear records and mismatched labels

**Scientific findings; criminal investigation · Argentina / Ushuaia and the southern shelf · 2023–2024 catches; 2024 investigation; 2025 dispute**

The record reaches beyond an excessive catch allegation: fisheries scientists found discrepancies in gear reporting, while prosecutors reported labels that did not match inspected contents.

INIDEP’s July 2024 analysis used official catch declarations and onboard observer data for Tai An. It concluded that some 2023–2024 catches recorded as taken with midwater gear should have been recorded as bottom trawling, which would contravene the cited protection-area rule. The scientists recommended retaining the incidental-catch cap. [S49: INIDEP; Martínez, Wöhler, Troccoli and Di Marco](https://marabiertonew.inidep.edu.ar/server/api/core/bitstreams/c1a38c58-e656-4d0e-8626-1e9d1fc3d487/content)

In May 2024, federal prosecutors described an investigation into juvenile toothfish catches during the February–March voyage. They also reported that a 21 March inspection found some packaging labels inconsistent with the contents. They sought ownership records and expert evidence to establish the extent and reversibility of environmental harm. [S48: Argentina, Ministerio Público Fiscal](https://www.fiscales.gob.ar/fiscalias/ushuaia-la-fiscalia-solicito-medidas-para-investigar-el-posible-dano-ambiental-de-un-buque-chino-que-pescaba-merluza-negra-de-forma-ilegal-en-el-mar-argentino/)

Tai An is an Argentine-registered vessel of Prodesur, associated in local reporting with Chinese-born entrepreneur Liu Zhijiang. Prodesur characterized the toothfish catch as incidental. Later reporting describes an administrative penalty and continuing quota litigation, which are distinct from a final criminal ruling. [S50: Infobae; Sergio Serrichio](https://www.infobae.com/economia/2025/06/09/el-empresario-chino-multado-por-capturas-ilegales-y-dano-ambiental-denuncio-al-consejo-de-pesca-quiere-cuota-de-merluza-negra-la-especie-mas-valiosa-del-mar-argentino/); [S73: elDiarioAR; Gabriel Ramonet](https://www.eldiarioar.com/politica/misterioso-rembrandt-175-toneladas-merluza-negra-empresario-chino-acusado-pesca-ilegal_1_11248385.html); [S49: INIDEP; Martínez, Wöhler, Troccoli and Di Marco](https://marabiertonew.inidep.edu.ar/server/api/core/bitstreams/c1a38c58-e656-4d0e-8626-1e9d1fc3d487/content)

**Why it matters.** A locally flagged ship can require scrutiny without any allegation that the flag itself is false. This case joins three evidence systems: scientific observers, catch declarations and physical product inspection. When they disagree, tracing the precise haul, gear and lot is more useful than assigning responsibility from a flag or a company’s nationality.

**Response and procedural posture.** Prodesur’s reported defense was incidental capture rather than directed toothfish fishing. INIDEP’s analysis challenges the gear and catch explanation. The subsequent quota complaint is reported as a disputed claim, not proof of corruption. [S50: Infobae; Sergio Serrichio](https://www.infobae.com/economia/2025/06/09/el-empresario-chino-multado-por-capturas-ilegales-y-dano-ambiental-denuncio-al-consejo-de-pesca-quiere-cuota-de-merluza-negra-la-especie-mas-valiosa-del-mar-argentino/); [S49: INIDEP; Martínez, Wöhler, Troccoli and Di Marco](https://marabiertonew.inidep.edu.ar/server/api/core/bitstreams/c1a38c58-e656-4d0e-8626-1e9d1fc3d487/content)

**Unresolved.** The prosecutor’s news release omits the vessel’s name; this file links it to Tai An through matching voyage dates and corroborating scientific and local reporting. The final criminal judgment, original sanction instrument and full chain of custody for the mismatched cartons were not obtained. Reported political-influence and bribery claims are not adopted as findings.

**State connection.** A Chinese-born owner’s involvement does not make an Argentine vessel a Chinese state operation. No state direction of the alleged conduct is established in these sources.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/tai-an-toothfish/)

### C24 — Shark fins in the mail: the Yuelin Gan Cao conviction

**Conviction reported by prosecutors · Peru / Ilo and Lima → Hong Kong · July 2019 inspection; April 2023 conviction**

A postal route linked Peru’s southern coast to a planned Hong Kong export. Prosecutors reported a five-year prison sentence after identifying protected shark products.

Peruvian prosecutors reported that Yuelin Gan Cao acquired and moved 65.88 kg of dried shark fins from Ilo to Lima through the postal system, intending to export them to Hong Kong. The planned export used three postal consignments. [S51: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/747604-fiscalia-logro-condena-a-ciudadano-por-trafico-ilegal-de-fauna-silvestre); [S52: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/749095-fiscalia-logra-carcel-efectiva-para-hombre-que-iba-exportar-aletas-de-tiburon-por-encomienda)

The follow-up release dates the customs inspection at Serpost’s Los Olivos premises to 25 July 2019. It states that the attempted shipment lacked the permit, license or valid certificate needed to establish legal origin and traceability. [S52: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/749095-fiscalia-logra-carcel-efectiva-para-hombre-que-iba-exportar-aletas-de-tiburon-por-encomienda)

The Public Ministry announced a five-year custodial sentence and monetary orders, including S/14,146 in civil reparation. A forensic assessment estimated the fins represented 32 protected sharks; the record does not establish that Gan Cao personally caught or killed them. [S51: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/747604-fiscalia-logro-condena-a-ciudadano-por-trafico-ilegal-de-fauna-silvestre); [S52: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/749095-fiscalia-logra-carcel-efectiva-para-hombre-que-iba-exportar-aletas-de-tiburon-por-encomienda)

**Why it matters.** Wildlife trafficking is not confined to container ships or fishing vessels. Small parcel channels connect coastal acquisition, inland consolidation and an overseas market. The case demonstrates the value of species identification and documentary traceability at the point of dispatch.

**Response and procedural posture.** The conviction is reported by the prosecuting institution. The two official accounts add different detail; no separately attributable defense statement or subsequent appellate decision was located. [S51: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/747604-fiscalia-logro-condena-a-ciudadano-por-trafico-ilegal-de-fauna-silvestre); [S52: Peru, Ministerio Público](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/749095-fiscalia-logra-carcel-efectiva-para-hombre-que-iba-exportar-aletas-de-tiburon-por-encomienda)

**Unresolved.** The underlying judgment, appeal history and collection of the monetary orders were not obtained. The reviewed releases do not name the eventual Hong Kong buyer or prove wrongdoing by Serpost. Its premises were the inspection location, not evidence that the postal service was a conspirator.

**State connection.** The prosecutor identifies Gan Cao as a Chinese citizen and Hong Kong as the intended destination. Neither fact establishes Chinese government involvement.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/peru-postal-shark-fins/)

### C25 — Two containers from Ecuador, 26 tonnes of suspected protected shark fins

**Customs seizures; outcome unresolved · Ecuador → Hong Kong · April–May 2020 seizures; October 2020 scientific follow-up**

Hong Kong Customs intercepted two Ecuador-origin shipments. The record establishes the trade route and seizures—not which fishing boats supplied the fins.

Hong Kong Customs reported inspecting two containers arriving from Ecuador on 28 April and 4 May 2020. Each held approximately 13 tonnes of suspected scheduled dried shark fins mixed with non-scheduled fins. One suspect was arrested and released on bail pending investigation. [S53: Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department](https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202005/06/P2020050600631.htm)

Researchers at Florida International University described the use of species-identification tools in customs enforcement and wider genetic work locating the eastern Pacific as a major supply region for threatened sharks. That research helps distinguish a biological source region from a commercial shipment’s point of departure. [S54: Florida International University](https://news.fiu.edu/2020/eastern-pacific-is-a-major-supply-chain-for-illegal-fin-trade%2C-researchers-find)

**Why it matters.** The commercial chain can be investigated even when the catching vessel is unknown. Export permits, species composition, container records and recipient records are the next links. A seizure at the destination also demonstrates that Chinese-linked trade routes can involve enforcement by Hong Kong authorities, not only failures of control.

**Response and procedural posture.** Customs explicitly said both investigations were ongoing in May 2020. The release did not identify the importer by name or include an attributable response; the file retains that unresolved posture. [S53: Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department](https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202005/06/P2020050600631.htm)

**Unresolved.** No final judgment for the unnamed suspect was obtained. Ecuadorian shipping origin does not prove the sharks were caught in the Galápagos, by Chinese vessels, or in a particular country’s waters. The two container weights are approximate, and a regional genetic study cannot establish an individual cargo’s complete chain of custody.

**State connection.** The verified connection is a shipment route from Ecuador to Hong Kong and a Hong Kong customs action. The record does not establish Chinese government direction of the trade.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/ecuador-hong-kong-fins/)

### C26 — The drying house behind a totoaba border seizure

**Federal sentencing · Mexico / Gulf of California → United States · April 2013 discovery; August 2014 sentence**

A border inspection led investigators to a Calexico house used to dry endangered fish products. The sentencing record reveals processing and consolidation beyond the initial smuggling trip.

In August 2014, DOJ reported a one-year prison sentence for Song Shen Zhen and US$120,500 in restitution ordered to Mexico’s environmental protection agency. The case concerned endangered totoaba swim bladders smuggled from Mexico. [S55: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/fishy-business-smuggler-swim-bladders-sentenced-federal-court)

The sentencing account separates 27 bladders discovered in a vehicle from 214 later found at a sparsely furnished house. Fans, drying rows and packing materials indicated preparation for further distribution. Evidence pointed to overseas shipping, but the release does not identify the final foreign buyer. [S55: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/fishy-business-smuggler-swim-bladders-sentenced-federal-court)

The earlier charging release placed the trade in the context of demand for fish maw in Chinese markets. NOAA separately describes the threat totoaba gillnets pose to vaquita in the Gulf of California. That ecological relationship is not proof that this particular shipment caused a vaquita death. [S56: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/massive-trade-endangered-species-uncovered-us-attorney-charges-7-smuggling-swim); [S57: NOAA Fisheries](https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species/vaquita)

**Why it matters.** This is a processing and distribution vignette, not simply an illegal-catch story. A modest house and ordinary packing equipment can connect a poached marine species to international commerce. The record also shows why cargo quantity, route and actual sentence should replace speculative black-market valuations in an accountability account.

**Response and procedural posture.** DOJ’s sentencing account is the primary outcome source. It supersedes inconsistent details in the initial charging announcement. A separately published defense response was not located. [S55: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/fishy-business-smuggler-swim-bladders-sentenced-federal-court); [S56: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/massive-trade-endangered-species-uncovered-us-attorney-charges-7-smuggling-swim)

**Unresolved.** Restitution was ordered; actual receipt was not verified. No Chinese state role, named overseas customer or particular fishing vessel is established. The verified route is Mexico to the United States, with evidence consistent with onward overseas distribution. The defendant’s nationality is not inferred from his name.

**State connection.** The Chinese connection is the market context identified by DOJ, not proven direction or participation by the Chinese government. The convicted conduct in this file took place in the Mexico–U.S. supply chain.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/totoaba-drying-house/)

### C27 — Promised factory jobs, placed aboard a fishing vessel

**Survivor accounts; police investigation · Indonesia / recruitment and the Malacca Strait · June 2020 escape and recruitment investigation**

Two Indonesian men reportedly escaped Lu Qing Yuan Yu 901 after alleged abuse. Police inquiries extended ashore to recruiters and purported seafarer certificates.

ANTARA reported that two Indonesian crew members, Reynalfi and Andri Juniansyah, jumped from a Chinese-flagged vessel on 5 June 2020 and were rescued by local fishers after hours in the water. Their accounts described excessive work, inadequate food and water, intimidation and violence. [S58: ANTARA](https://en.antaranews.com/news/150860/clamor-grows-for-ending-trafficking-slavery-on-the-seas)

The Jakarta Post reported a police statement naming three recruiter suspects in the alleged trafficking case. The investigation concerned promises of factory work in South Korea followed by placement on a fishing vessel, recruitment costs and unpaid work. Police also investigated purportedly forged seafarer training certificates. [S59: The Jakarta Post](https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/16/police-name-three-recruiters-as-suspects-in-chinese-vessel-human-trafficking-case)

The mechanism spans more than one jurisdiction and more than the ship’s crew: a promised job, recruitment paperwork, departure, placement and the inability to leave. The reviewed reporting supports scrutiny of that chain, but it does not establish the criminal liability of every recruiter or the vessel’s owner. [S58: ANTARA](https://en.antaranews.com/news/150860/clamor-grows-for-ending-trafficking-slavery-on-the-seas); [S59: The Jakarta Post](https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/16/police-name-three-recruiters-as-suspects-in-chinese-vessel-human-trafficking-case)

**Why it matters.** Recruitment is a point at which exploitation can be prevented or investigated before a ship leaves port. Matching the promised occupation to the actual contract and placement is as important as checking a vessel’s flag. This comparison helps explain questions to ask of recruiting chains serving fleets in the Americas; it is not evidence that this vessel operated there.

**Response and procedural posture.** The cited reporting records investigative and diplomatic steps, not a completed trial. A specific operator response for this vessel was not located. Broader Chinese responses concerning other vessels are not substituted for one here. [S58: ANTARA](https://en.antaranews.com/news/150860/clamor-grows-for-ending-trafficking-slavery-on-the-seas); [S59: The Jakarta Post](https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/16/police-name-three-recruiters-as-suspects-in-chinese-vessel-human-trafficking-case)

**Unresolved.** A complete final judgment and appeal record for the recruiter case were not obtained. A court-document mirror was found as a lead but not used to attribute guilt without a verified original and identity match. This episode must not be merged with separate Long Xing burial cases or other similarly named Lu Qing Yuan Yu vessels.

**State connection.** Chinese flag and crew connections are reported, but a Chinese government instruction to exploit these workers is not established. Indonesian authorities investigated alleged recruiter conduct ashore.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/lu-qing-yuan-yu-901/)

### C28 — One fishing trip, three country-coded AIS identities

**Tracking-based identity analysis · Argentina / Peru / waters near Galápagos · 2020 transmissions; July 2021 analysis**

Global Fishing Watch traced Yong Xing 1 through changes in transmitted identifiers associated with China, South Korea and Argentina. That is not the same as three verified national registrations.

Global Fishing Watch’s 2021 analysis describes Yong Xing 1 operating near Argentina and Peru with MMSI 412326889 until July 2020, then using 440106889 and 701006889 during later segments. Those prefixes correspond to China, South Korea and Argentina. The report describes sequential identity changes, not three simultaneous vessels. [S60: Global Fishing Watch](https://globalfishingwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/GFW-2021-FA-SQUID2020-EN-1.pdf)

The analysis also associates the broadcast name Hong Rui 198 with parts of this track. A SPRFMO record supplies a separate identity anchor for the Chinese vessel Yong Xing 1, IMO 8776497. Names and broadcast aliases should be checked against stable hull identifiers and dated records. [S60: Global Fishing Watch](https://globalfishingwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/GFW-2021-FA-SQUID2020-EN-1.pdf); [S72: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/7th-CTC-2020/meeting-documents/CTC7-Doc08-rev1-Commission-Record-of-Vessels-Implementation-Report-b.pdf)

**Why it matters.** A database organized only by broadcast name or MMSI can fragment one voyage into several apparent vessels. Readers need to see the identity chain and the confidence of each match. This is a concrete identity-risk example, while the legal question of fraudulent registration requires evidence from the relevant flag administrations.

**Response and procedural posture.** An operator explanation or subsequent official adjudication of these specific transmissions was not located. The case is therefore labeled as an analytical finding, not a proven fraudulent-flag registration. [S60: Global Fishing Watch](https://globalfishingwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/GFW-2021-FA-SQUID2020-EN-1.pdf)

**Unresolved.** The report supports a tracking attribution, not a final fraud ruling. It does not establish that Argentina or South Korea actually registered the ship, that every position was false, or who configured the equipment. The archived 2020 identity should not be mistaken for a current authorization.

**State connection.** The investigated vessel is identified as Chinese-flagged. Transmitting another country’s MMSI prefix does not establish that country’s participation, permission or government control.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/yong-xing-1-identity/)

### C29 — When China instructed two vessels to refuse inspection

**Documented state instruction; disputed compliance · Southeast Pacific / SPRFMO; decision in Manta, Ecuador · August 2022 refusals; February 2023 decision**

SPRFMO records explicitly connect two refused U.S. boardings to Chinese government instructions. They also record the decision not to put the vessels on the final IUU list.

The 2023 committee record identifies Zhou Yu 929 and Pu Yuan 755 as the two Chinese-flagged vessels proposed by the United States for IUU listing after refused at-sea inspections on 4 August 2022. [S62: SPRFMO](https://sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/10th-CTC-2023/SPRFMO-CTC10-Report-2023-final-with-Annexes.pdf); [S61: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/11th-Commission-2022-COMM11/COMM11-Report/SPRFMO-COMM11-Report-2023-with-annexes.pdf)

China told the Commission that its authorities had directed the refusals, citing its interpretation of the boarding measure. Its submission raised advance notice, registration, communication and pandemic concerns; other members disputed its legal interpretation. This is a stated government action, not an inference from ownership. [S61: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/11th-Commission-2022-COMM11/COMM11-Report/SPRFMO-COMM11-Report-2023-with-annexes.pdf)

The Commission did not assign China a compliance status on the disputed obligation and agreed not to include the two vessels on the final list. It adopted a more detailed boarding-and-inspection measure. The 2023 final IUU list contained no vessels. [S61: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/11th-Commission-2022-COMM11/COMM11-Report/SPRFMO-COMM11-Report-2023-with-annexes.pdf)

**Why it matters.** The case reveals a limit of inspection systems: access can turn on disagreement between states rather than the conduct of a captain alone. It also shows how a provisional blacklist proposal can become a misleading claim of permanent designation if the final meeting decision is omitted.

**Response and procedural posture.** China contested the inspection’s authorization and relied on its interpretation of the existing rules. Other members disagreed. Both positions and the Commission’s non-listing outcome remain part of the file. [S61: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/11th-Commission-2022-COMM11/COMM11-Report/SPRFMO-COMM11-Report-2023-with-annexes.pdf)

**Unresolved.** The minutes do not adjudicate every allegation about the voyage or establish that the vessels were illegally catching fish. Refusal, alleged catch violations and dangerous navigation are separate questions. This file does not attribute a reported ramming incident to either vessel without a verified identification.

**State connection.** Direct and documented: China acknowledged instructing the two vessels to refuse the boardings. The legality of that instruction was disputed; the Commission chose not to assess the obligation or impose final listing in this proceeding.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/refused-inspections-2022/)

### C30 — Damanzaihao: support services, changing owners and a later delisting

**Historical IUU listing; delisted in 2020 · Peru / Panama / China; cross-ocean ownership history · 2015 listing; 2018 transfer and port calls; 2020 delisting**

A processing mother ship linked historically to the Pacific Andes group became an IUU-list and port-access case. Its subsequent sale and removal from the list are essential parts of the history.

In 2015, the Damanzaihao listing concerned unauthorized presence and support for fishing vessels, not simply catching fish. A Pacific Andes spokesman argued that the vessel supplied authorized trawlers and that listing was disproportionate. A later U.S. bankruptcy decision identifies Damanzaihao among SFR’s assets in the group’s financial proceedings. [S68: SeafoodSource; Sean Murphy](https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/pacific-andes-vessel-placed-on-iuu-fishing-list); [S67: U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-nysb-1_16-bk-11914/pdf/USCOURTS-nysb-1_16-bk-11914-0.pdf)

SPRFMO’s 2019 compliance report examined services and access received by the renamed Vladivostok 2000 while it remained listed. The report includes China’s acknowledgment that the vessel entered Dalian and its undertaking to inspect it. The case demonstrates that port and support obligations can extend beyond the state where fish were caught. [S63: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/7th-Commission-2019-COMM7/reports/ANNEX-4-COMM7-2019-Final-Compliance-Report.pdf)

The 2020 committee record describes additional ownership information and Russian assurances that the new owners were not connected to the previous owners and that no SPRFMO fishing permit was intended. The Commission then removed Vladivostok 2000 from the IUU list. This was an adopted decision, not merely an owner’s request. [S64: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/7th-CTC-2020/CTC7-Meeting-Report-10Mar2020.pdf); [S65: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/8th-Commission-2020-COMM8/COMM8-Meeting-Report-Final-10Mar2020.pdf)

**Why it matters.** A factory or mother ship can enable a fleet even if it does not itself deploy fishing gear. Accountability requires separating the vessel’s operating role, the company in control at the time and later owners. The same discipline prevents a historical blacklist entry from following a vessel forever as if no subsequent decision existed.

**Response and procedural posture.** Pacific Andes disputed the proportionality of the original listing and emphasized the ship’s support role. Later ownership submissions were accepted through the RFMO process, resulting in delisting in 2020. Both the original conduct and later outcome are retained. [S68: SeafoodSource; Sean Murphy](https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/pacific-andes-vessel-placed-on-iuu-fishing-list); [S64: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/7th-CTC-2020/CTC7-Meeting-Report-10Mar2020.pdf); [S65: SPRFMO](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/8th-Commission-2020-COMM8/COMM8-Meeting-Report-Final-10Mar2020.pdf)

**Unresolved.** This file does not treat the ship as currently IUU-listed or continuously Chinese-controlled. It does not resolve every Peruvian financial or environmental proceeding, or the vessel’s later Russian ownership disputes. Transfer of ownership and flag is documented as history, not automatically described as fraudulent.

**State connection.** The historical China-linked corporate group and subsequent Dalian port-access issue are distinct. The record does not establish that every later owner acted for the Chinese state; flag administrations’ responsibilities are assessed separately.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/damanzaihao/)

### C31 — Imported crab repacked as American: the Casey’s Seafood case

**Federal conviction and sentencing · United States / Virginia; imports from Asia and the Americas · 2012–2015 scheme; 2018 charge; January 2019 sentence**

A U.S. seafood processor blended and repacked imported crab under a domestic-origin label. China was among several source countries—not the location of the proven labeling offense.

DOJ’s sentencing announcement describes a scheme at Casey’s Seafood to replace or blend domestic blue crab with imported meat from China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Central and South America. Employees repacked it under labels declaring U.S. origin. [S71: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/owner-seafood-company-sentenced-prison-blue-crab-scam)

The contemporaneous sentencing bulletin reports that owner James R. Casey received 45 months in prison, three years of supervised release and a US$15,000 fine on 9 January 2019. DOJ described close to 400,000 pounds of falsely labeled crab meat across the scheme. [S70: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2019/03/25/february_2019_bulletin_redacted_0.pdf)

The offense concerned false labeling by the U.S. business. Neither the charging nor sentencing announcement establishes that the foreign catch was illegally harvested or that all overseas suppliers knew about the domestic repacking scheme. [S69: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/owner-seafood-company-charged-atlantic-blue-crab-scam); [S71: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/owner-seafood-company-sentenced-prison-blue-crab-scam)

**Why it matters.** Following catch to market must include misconduct by buyers and processors in the Americas. Repacking can erase origin information after a lawful import and distort competition for local fishers. This case gives a concrete, adjudicated mechanism without making imported seafood itself synonymous with illegality.

**Response and procedural posture.** The sentencing sources describe the criminal outcome following the case. No additional defense statement is used, and the site does not transfer the U.S. processor’s conviction to unnamed foreign suppliers. [S70: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2019/03/25/february_2019_bulletin_redacted_0.pdf); [S71: U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/owner-seafood-company-sentenced-prison-blue-crab-scam)

**Unresolved.** No full supplier-by-supplier chain is established. A later DOJ release about Michael Casey gives a different prison length for James; this file uses the contemporaneous sentencing bulletin. The sentence is a historical outcome, not a claim about current custody or current company operations.

**State connection.** China is one of several reported product-source countries. The established conduct was by a U.S. processor; no Chinese government or supplier complicity is established.

[Full timeline and actor links](https://oceanaccountability.com/cases/caseys-crab-labels/)

## Conflicts and exclusions

- Hong Pu 16: initial and later official cargo quantities differ. Both figures are attributed; the larger figure is not selected as a settled total.
- Run Da 608: a requested prison term and trial referral are not treated as a sentence.
- Casey: the contemporary 2019 sentencing bulletin supports 45 months; a later inconsistent account was not used to overwrite it.
- Operation Apex: the original indictment was not sufficient for a new current-status vignette. A later self-reported disclosure indicated a changed outcome for an individual, but the underlying disposition was not obtained. No guilt claim was published from that unresolved lead.
- Wisdom Sea Reefer: the investigated ownership connection did not establish the required China link. It was not inserted as a Chinese-linked offender case.
- Anonymized NGO vessel studies were not assigned names from unrelated cases.
- Reflagging, ownership changes, humanitarian port calls and ordinary commercial services were not treated as illegal without additional evidence.

## Next primary records to obtain

1. Final Run Da 608 and Indonesian recruitment judgments, with appeals and exact defendants.
2. Compensation and restitution receipts rather than only orders to pay.
3. Dated corporate filings and sale records that connect beneficial owners to stable hull identifiers.
4. Matched cargo lots, transfer manifests and invoices before attributing sales to a final buyer.
5. Contemporary port authorization and inspection outcomes, including lawful crew-change and medical exceptions.
6. Current WRO modifications before claiming a historical import order is still active.

## Source register for the expansion

### S39 — El patrullero oceánico ARA Bouchard arribó a Puerto Belgrano

Argentine Navy · 2020-05-12 · official enforcement account

[Original source](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/el-patrullero-oceanico-ara-bouchard-arribo-puerto-belgrano)

Detection and boarding on 4 May 2020

**Limit:** Initial cargo estimate differs from the later parliamentary report; enforcement narrative is not a criminal judgment.

### S40 — Informe 130 a la Cámara de Diputados

Argentina, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros · 2021 · official parliamentary accountability report

[Original source](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/informe_130-_hdn.pdf)

PDF p. 119 and pp. 1143–1144; 2020 seizures, payments and releases

**Limit:** Totals and component amounts vary slightly between responses. Use reported totals, not a newly calculated aggregate; historical Argentine pesos, not current values.

### S41 — Prefectura escolta hacia mar territorial argentino a un buque infractor

Argentina, Prefectura Naval · 2020-05-13 · official enforcement account

[Original source](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/prefectura-escolta-hacia-mar-territorial-argentino-un-buque-infractor)

Lu Rong Yuan Yu 668: 28 April detection and 13 May escort

**Limit:** Contemporaneous investigation announcement; subsequent payment is established separately in S40.

### S42 — CSMS 65176258: Withhold Release Order on Seafood Harvested by Zhen Fa 7

U.S. Customs and Border Protection · 2025-05-28 · official import-control notice

[Original source](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/3e282c2)

Effective date, reasonable-indication standard and importer challenge procedures

**Limit:** Historical WRO issuance, not a criminal conviction or a determination about every customer; subsequent modification status needs a fresh official list check.

### S43 — Zhen Fa 7: vessel record

The Outlaw Ocean Project · Date precision recorded in source · original investigative vessel database

[Original source](https://b2p.theoutlawocean.com/vessels/zhen-fa-7)

Operator, IMO 8776966, crew case notes and linked processing network

**Limit:** Reported findings, not a judgment. Commercial links do not prove a particular retail product contains this vessel’s catch.

### S44 — Rongcheng Wangdao Dayang Aquatic Products: correspondence

The Outlaw Ocean Project / company response · 2023 · published right-of-reply correspondence

[Original source](https://theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/discussion/stakeholders/rongcheng-wangdao-dayang-aquatic-products-co-ltd/)

February–August 2023 questions and company denial

**Limit:** The company response is a party statement; reporters’ questions are allegations, not independent findings.

### S45 — A Fleet Prone to Captive Labor and Plunder

The Outlaw Ocean Project · 2023 · original investigative reporting

[Original source](https://theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/a-fleet-prone-to-captive-labor-and-plunder/)

Daniel Aritonang, Heri Kusmanto, recruitment contracts and South American voyage

**Limit:** Interviews and documentary reporting; medical and illegal-fishing inferences require attribution. AIS gaps alone do not establish an incursion.

### S46 — Ministerio de la Producción decomisa 19 toneladas de pota de una embarcación china

Peru, Ministerio de la Producción · 2018 · official seizure announcement

[Original source](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/produce/noticias/23257-ministerio-de-la-produccion-decomisa-19-toneladas-del-recursos-pota-de-una-embarcacion-china)

Run Da 608 seizure in Áncash

**Limit:** Seizure and ministry characterization are separate from the captain’s later criminal adjudication.

### S47 — Ministerio Público consiguió que caso Run Da 608 pase a juicio oral

Peru, Ministerio Público · 2020-10-23 · official prosecution update

[Original source](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/309445-ministerio-publico-consiguio-que-caso-run-da-608-pase-a-juicio-oral)

Captain Zhuang Hanbo, company, alleged extraction and requested penalty

**Limit:** Referral to trial is not a conviction. Three years four months and S/71,250 were requested, not an established sentence or payment.

### S48 — Ushuaia: la fiscalía solicitó medidas para investigar posible daño ambiental

Argentina, Ministerio Público Fiscal · 2024-05-31 · official investigation announcement

[Original source](https://www.fiscales.gob.ar/fiscalias/ushuaia-la-fiscalia-solicito-medidas-para-investigar-el-posible-dano-ambiental-de-un-buque-chino-que-pescaba-merluza-negra-de-forma-ilegal-en-el-mar-argentino/)

21 March inspection, juvenile catches, labeling discrepancies and requested expert evidence

**Limit:** The announcement does not name the vessel; attribution to Tai An is corroborated by matching voyage dates in INIDEP and contemporary reporting. Investigation, not a final criminal judgment.

### S49 — INIDEP 065/24: Tai An catches and hourly yields, 2018–June 2024

INIDEP; Martínez, Wöhler, Troccoli and Di Marco · 2024-07-29 · government scientific report

[Original source](https://marabiertonew.inidep.edu.ar/server/api/core/bitstreams/c1a38c58-e656-4d0e-8626-1e9d1fc3d487/content)

Summary and methods; official catch statistics versus observer-recorded gear

**Limit:** Technical assessment, not a court judgment. Distinguishes historical quota years and gear types; findings concern the period studied.

### S50 — Prodesur’s quota dispute after the Tai An case

Infobae; Sergio Serrichio · 2025-06-09 · original reporting and reported company position

[Original source](https://www.infobae.com/economia/2025/06/09/el-empresario-chino-multado-por-capturas-ilegales-y-dano-ambiental-denuncio-al-consejo-de-pesca-quiere-cuota-de-merluza-negra-la-especie-mas-valiosa-del-mar-argentino/)

Prodesur’s incidental-catch defense, later quota complaint and reported administrative sanction

**Limit:** Reported sanction and complaint are not original judgments. Allegations of bribery or political influence are not adopted as findings.

### S51 — Fiscalía logró condena a ciudadano por tráfico ilegal de fauna silvestre

Peru, Ministerio Público · 2023-04-21 · official conviction report

[Original source](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/747604-fiscalia-logro-condena-a-ciudadano-por-trafico-ilegal-de-fauna-silvestre)

Yuelin Gan Cao conviction, 65.88 kg, three consignments and monetary orders

**Limit:** Reports trial outcome; appellate status and collection of monetary orders not obtained. No finding that the postal carrier knowingly participated.

### S52 — Fiscalía logra cárcel efectiva para hombre que iba a exportar aletas por encomienda

Peru, Ministerio Público · 2023-04-25 · official conviction follow-up

[Original source](https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/749095-fiscalia-logra-carcel-efectiva-para-hombre-que-iba-exportar-aletas-de-tiburon-por-encomienda)

25 July 2019 customs inspection, Hong Kong destination and nationality

**Limit:** Corrects or adds detail to the earlier release. Species wording differs; the site avoids inferring that the defendant personally caught or killed the sharks.

### S53 — Hong Kong Customs makes record seizure of smuggled scheduled dried shark fins

Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department · 2020-05-06 · official customs seizure announcement

[Original source](https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202005/06/P2020050600631.htm)

28 April and 4 May container inspections; Ecuador origin; suspect released on bail

**Limit:** Two seizures of approximately 13 tonnes each; suspected scheduled fins, not a conviction. Does not identify the fishing vessels or prove Galápagos origin.

### S54 — Eastern Pacific is a major supply chain for illegal fin trade, researchers find

Florida International University · 2020-10-13 · research institution account of original scientific work

[Original source](https://news.fiu.edu/2020/eastern-pacific-is-a-major-supply-chain-for-illegal-fin-trade%2C-researchers-find)

Genetic origin research and species-identification toolkit used in customs work

**Limit:** Regional biological origin does not identify a particular catching vessel; institutional summary rather than a seizure judgment.

### S55 — Fishy Business: smuggler of swim bladders sentenced in federal court

U.S. Department of Justice · 2014-08-11 · official sentencing report

[Original source](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/fishy-business-smuggler-swim-bladders-sentenced-federal-court)

Song Shen Zhen: sentence, restitution, border discovery and drying house

**Limit:** 27 bladders found at the border and 214 at the house, not 241 in the car. Restitution ordered does not establish payment; overseas buyer unidentified.

### S56 — Massive trade in endangered species uncovered: totoaba cases

U.S. Department of Justice · 2013-04-24 · official charging announcement and market context

[Original source](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/massive-trade-endangered-species-uncovered-us-attorney-charges-7-smuggling-swim)

Zhen search and Chinese-market context

**Limit:** Other defendants’ charges are not their convictions. Some chronology and seizure detail differ from the later sentencing account; S55 controls for Zhen.

### S57 — Vaquita: species and threats

NOAA Fisheries · Date precision recorded in source · official species assessment

[Original source](https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species/vaquita)

Totoaba gillnet bycatch and Gulf of California habitat

**Limit:** Species-level ecological context does not prove a specific trafficker caused an individual vaquita death.

### S58 — Clamor grows for ending trafficking, slavery on the seas

ANTARA · 2020-06-16 · original reporting quoting survivors and Indonesian officials

[Original source](https://en.antaranews.com/news/150860/clamor-grows-for-ending-trafficking-slavery-on-the-seas)

5 June escape from Lu Qing Yuan Yu 901 and recruitment promises

**Limit:** Report combines several separate vessels’ cases; do not transfer Long Xing burial details to this vessel. Final recruiter adjudication not established.

### S59 — Police name three recruiters as suspects in Chinese vessel human trafficking case

The Jakarta Post · 2020-06-16 · original reporting on police statement

[Original source](https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/16/police-name-three-recruiters-as-suspects-in-chinese-vessel-human-trafficking-case)

Recruiter suspects, job deception and alleged certificate forgery

**Limit:** Police allegations and suspect designations, not convictions. Initials are retained; no attempt to expose unidentified suspects.

### S60 — Analysis of the Southeast Pacific squid fleet, July 2021

Global Fishing Watch · 2021-07 · original satellite and vessel-identity analysis

[Original source](https://globalfishingwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/GFW-2021-FA-SQUID2020-EN-1.pdf)

Multiple MMSI analysis and Yong Xing 1 case study; Spanish version p. 33

**Limit:** AIS country prefixes are not proof of valid flag registration. Intent, operator responsibility and legal outcome need further evidence; one hull can broadcast multiple identities.

### S61 — 11th SPRFMO Commission meeting report and annexes

SPRFMO · 2023 · intergovernmental decision and party submissions

[Original source](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/11th-Commission-2022-COMM11/COMM11-Report/SPRFMO-COMM11-Report-2023-with-annexes.pdf)

Printed pp. 5–6; Annex 6a Table 12 (PDF p. 68)

**Limit:** Records competing legal positions and a decision not to list the two vessels; provisional-list allegations must not be presented as final IUU designation.

### S62 — 10th Compliance and Technical Committee report

SPRFMO · 2023 · intergovernmental committee record

[Original source](https://sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/10th-CTC-2023/SPRFMO-CTC10-Report-2023-final-with-Annexes.pdf)

Paragraph 58 onward: Zhou Yu 929 and Pu Yuan 755 proposals

**Limit:** Committee stage is not the final Commission decision; read with S61.

### S63 — 2019 Final Compliance Report: Damanzaihao / Vladivostok 2000

SPRFMO · 2019 · intergovernmental compliance findings

[Original source](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/7th-Commission-2019-COMM7/reports/ANNEX-4-COMM7-2019-Final-Compliance-Report.pdf)

Table 4: port access, services and responses from China, Panama and Cook Islands

**Limit:** Historical compliance findings; vessel was subsequently removed from the IUU list. Does not show that later owners committed earlier conduct.

### S64 — CTC7 report: removal request for Vladivostok 2000

SPRFMO · 2020-03-10 · intergovernmental committee record

[Original source](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/7th-CTC-2020/CTC7-Meeting-Report-10Mar2020.pdf)

Paragraphs 134–139, ownership change and Russian assurances

**Limit:** Summarizes evidence and flag-state representations; recommendation must be read with the final Commission decision.

### S65 — 8th Commission meeting report: IUU-list decisions

SPRFMO · 2020-03-10 · intergovernmental final decision

[Original source](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/8th-Commission-2020-COMM8/COMM8-Meeting-Report-Final-10Mar2020.pdf)

Paragraphs 66–67: removal of Vladivostok 2000

**Limit:** 2020 delisting is established; not a current registry or a ruling erasing earlier conduct.

### S66 — Triple sale by Atlantic Shipping

Atlantic Shipping · 2018-04 · original broker transaction announcement

[Original source](https://www.atlanticship.dk/triple-sale-by-atlantic-shipping/)

April 2018 sale announcement for processing mother vessel Damanzaihao

**Limit:** Commercial party statement; a sale by itself neither establishes wrongdoing nor resolves liability.

### S67 — China Fishery-related Chapter 11 decision, document 23

U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York · 2016-11-15 · published court decision

[Original source](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-nysb-1_16-bk-11914/pdf/USCOURTS-nysb-1_16-bk-11914-0.pdf)

Corporate background and SFR / Damanzaihao asset discussion

**Limit:** Financial proceeding, not an illegal-fishing judgment. Historical group structure must not be carried forward after a sale.

### S68 — Pacific Andes vessel placed on IUU fishing list

SeafoodSource; Sean Murphy · 2015 · original reporting including company response

[Original source](https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/pacific-andes-vessel-placed-on-iuu-fishing-list)

2015 listing and Geoffrey Walsh’s response

**Limit:** Contemporaneous report and party response; superseded as to current listing by the 2020 delisting.

### S69 — Owner of seafood company charged in Atlantic blue crab scam

U.S. Department of Justice · 2018-01-12 · official charging announcement

[Original source](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/owner-seafood-company-charged-atlantic-blue-crab-scam)

Imported sources and repacking allegations

**Limit:** Initial allegations; later sentencing establishes the outcome. Imported origin alone is not illegal.

### S70 — Environmental Crimes Section Monthly Bulletin, February 2019

U.S. Department of Justice · 2019-02 · official sentencing report

[Original source](https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2019/03/25/february_2019_bulletin_redacted_0.pdf)

United States v. James R. Casey, 4:18-cr-00004

**Limit:** Reports 45-month sentence; a later release about a different defendant says 48 months. This file uses the contemporaneous sentencing bulletin.

### S71 — Owner of seafood company sentenced to prison for blue crab scam

U.S. Department of Justice · 2019-01-09 · official sentencing announcement

[Original source](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/owner-seafood-company-sentenced-prison-blue-crab-scam)

James Casey, false origin labels, source countries and volume

**Limit:** U.S. processor’s offense; does not establish foreign suppliers knowingly participated or the catch was illegally harvested.

### S72 — 2020 Record of Vessels implementation report

SPRFMO · 2020 · historical intergovernmental vessel register

[Original source](https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/03-CTC/7th-CTC-2020/meeting-documents/CTC7-Doc08-rev1-Commission-Record-of-Vessels-Implementation-Report-b.pdf)

Yong Xing 1 row: IMO 8776497

**Limit:** Historical identity anchor. This is not a current vessel authorization or a record of accepted Argentine or Korean flag registration.

### S73 — Profile of Liu Zhijiang and Prodesur in the Tai An case

elDiarioAR; Gabriel Ramonet · 2024-03-29 · original local reporting

[Original source](https://www.eldiarioar.com/politica/misterioso-rembrandt-175-toneladas-merluza-negra-empresario-chino-acusado-pesca-ilegal_1_11248385.html)

Prodesur ownership and Chinese-born entrepreneur established in Tierra del Fuego

**Limit:** Biography is not proof of state direction; unrelated personal-business claims are not adopted by this project.

### S74 — Autoridad Marítima realizó visita inspectiva a buque pesquero chino Hai Li 18

Chile, Directemar · 2025 · official port inspection account

[Original source](https://www.directemar.cl/autoridad-maritima-realizo-visita-inspectiva)

Valparaíso crew-change authorization and inspection

**Limit:** Authorized port use and inspection do not by themselves establish any violation.

## Use and corrections

This document contains Ocean Accountability’s original synthesis. It does not grant rights to reproduce third-party reports or underlying datasets. Fictional AI-generated illustrations are separate from the evidence.

Country briefings and the full structured records are available at [Ocean Accountability](https://oceanaccountability.com/data/). Send precise corrections and public supporting documents to [support@oceanaccountability.com](mailto:support@oceanaccountability.com).